The United States is now facing its most complicated crisis since Sept. 11. We will probably go to war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The rationale for doing so is that he is a genocidal dictator who already possesses chemical and biological weapons and is trying to get his hands on a nuclear weapon.
In the midst of preparing for this war, another mad dictator, North Korea’s Kim Jong Il, is threatening to declare war on the United States unless we resume sending food and oil to his country. According to most intelligence estimates, North Korea possesses at least one nuclear weapon, possibly two or three.
So, why are we preparing to attack Iraq but will not invade North Korea?
Two types of reasons exist: good reasons and actual reasons. Remember that politicians tend to do things for the real reason and then find a good (read: Lottpolitically correct) reason.
Iraq has an easily defeatable military and sits on a huge cache of oil while North Korea has a million-member military and is located in a place with many natural obstacles-mountains, ocean and bad weather.
While our military could defeat North Korea (fun fact: the United Stated spends more on defense than the next 15 countries combined), more Americans would die in combat in a war with North Korea than with Iraq. Also, North Korea has missiles that can easily reach Japan and South Korea, two of our closest and most important allies. However, the chief reason is that a bunch of American casualties and a long, difficult conflict might cost the Bush administration re-election. The last thing anyone wants is another “quagmire” like Vietnam.
Cynical and callused reasoning? Sure. But discussing war without political fallout is like trying to discuss Middle Eastern politics without mentioning oil or Islam. In this case, the actual reason we will attack Iraq is because we want pro-American leadership over the world’s second-largest supply of oil and to make sure one of the world’s truly despicable characters will not be the first Arab leader to possess a nuclear weapon. The good reason to invade is that we will bring democracy and freedom to Iraq.
We will let North Korea remain dangerous because a war might cost many Americans their lives and President Bush his job. The good reason is that North Korea can supposedly be deterred through “conventional means”-whatever that means.
But the thing to remember about good reasons is that they rarely work out. For example, the good reason for financing Islamic extremists in Afghanistan in the 1980s was to bring democracy and freedom to Afghanistan. Guess what didn’t happen?
Hence, the actual reasons are what’s important. The question is this: can we make our real reasons work out?
Good reasons and actual reasons for why we should not invade Iraq should also be considered. The good reason is that a United States attack would cost many Iraqi civilians their lives. However, it is worth noting that our attack on Afghanistan raised similar issues. While the United States killed approximately 30,000 Afghans, 3 million Afghans received life-saving medical care, vaccinations and food.
The real reason for not invading has to do with world public opinion. We shouldn’t care what extremist terrorists think, but Arab public opinion is another matter. European public opinion is also important. An attack on Iraq without a bonefide causus belli will inflame both and make it that much more difficult to get cooperation from our allies in combating al Qaeda and terrorism in general.
If we become so unpopular with other nation’s’ citizens that they won’t support leaders with close ties to the United States, we could lose our position as the world’s peace broker and policeman. While some might say that the United States should take a less active role in world affairs anyway, the fact is that the world is a safer place when the biggest economy in the world is also actively involved in world security and diplomacy.
If losing power and influence overseas seems unlikely, remember the last German elections. Anti-Americanism was a prerequisite for any party seeking office. While Bush appropriately chilled relations with Germany afterward, the election represented European outrage, justified or unjustified, over American policy.
Both conflicts present several vexing questions. So many, in fact, that I think how Bush resolves these two issues, instead of his post-Sept. 11 actions, will define his presidency.
Wilson Boyd is a senior economics major.